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Abstract 
 
Influential theories depict politicians as, alternatively, strongly constrained by public opinion, 
able to shape public opinion with persuasive appeals, or relatively unconstrained by public 
opinion and able to shape it merely by announcing their positions. To test these theories, we 
conducted unique field experiments in cooperation with sitting politicians in which US state 
legislators sent constituents official communications with randomly assigned content. The 
legislators sometimes stated their issue positions in these letters, sometimes supported by 
extensive arguments but sometimes minimally justified; in many cases, these issue positions 
were at odds with voters’. An ostensibly unrelated survey found that voters often adopted the 
positions legislators took, even when legislators offered little justification. Moreover, voters did 
not evaluate their legislators more negatively when representatives took positions these voters 
had previously opposed, again regardless of whether legislators provided justifications. The 
findings are consistent with theories suggesting voters often defer to politicians’ policy 
judgments. 
 
Replication Materials: The data, code, and any additional materials required to replicate all 
analyses in this article are available on the American Journal of Political Science Dataverse 
within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/YZQTAH. 
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Classical conceptions of representative democracy envision public opinion placing strong 
constraints on politicians’ decisions: electoral accountability compels politicians to support 
policies that are broadly popular among citizens, lest they face electoral sanction (Downs 1957; 
Loewen and Rubenson 2010). Consistent with these conceptions, there is a strong relationship 
between public opinion and politicians’ policy positions (e.g., Brody and Page 1972). 
Research on opinion leadership has long offered an alternative explanation for the 
correspondence between public opinion and the politicians’ policy positions: citizens may adopt 
politicians’ positions as their own. Over the last several decades, evidence that elites do indeed 
influence public opinion has mounted (e.g., Abramowitz 1978; Gabel and Scheve 2007; Lenz 
2009, 2012; Minozzi et al. 2014). 
Despite the breadth of opinion leadership research, the nature of opinion leadership and 
its implications for democratic accountability are increasingly contested. On the one hand, 
classic theoretical accounts characterize opinion leadership as reflecting elite persuasion. These 
accounts contend that elites shape public opinion primarily by highlighting how their policy 
proposals are consistent with citizens’ preexisting values or arguing they will accomplish shared 
goals (e.g., Chong and Druckman 2007a, 2007b; Grose et al. 2014; Kinder and Sanders 1990; 
Jacoby 2000; Tesler 2014; Zaller 1992). Such theories generally imply that politicians’ 
accountability to public opinion remains relatively robust: if citizens reliably demand that 
politicians persuasively justify their positions, politicians will eschew taking positions they do 
not believe they can persuasively defend (e.g., Fenno 1978; Kingdon 1989). 
However, a different theoretical perspective suggests that, at least some of the time, 
opinion leadership is better characterized as a process of position adoption. This position 
adoption perspective claims that citizens often defer to politicians’ policy judgments and do not 
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require persuasive arguments to change their views on issues. Citizens thus are not expected to 
reliably evaluate their representatives more negatively when learning their representatives 
support policies they oppose, and may even adopt their representatives’ positions as their own – 
even in the absence of persuasive justifications (e.g., Achen and Bartels 2006; Bartels 2005; 
Cohen 2003; Leeper 2013; Lenz 2009, 2012; Mackie and Cooper 1984). Such position adoption, 
to the extent it occurs, implies that citizens are inclined to defer to politicians’ judgment without 
demanding justifications. Consequently, public opinion may not constrain politicians’ decisions 
much at all. 
The notion that such position adoption can describe public opinion even some of the time 
has been understandably controversial (for review, see Bullock 2011), but is consistent with a 
number of broader theories. On the one hand, democratic theory suggests citizens may believe 
elites have superior policy information, expertise, or judgment (Burke 1774; see also Bianco 
1994; Fox and Shotts 2009). Likewise, psychological studies suggest citizens may tend to defer 
to authority figures on even significant personal matters (e.g., Milgram 1974, Epilogue). 
Nevertheless, this perspective sits at odds with most contemporary theories of democratic 
politics, which tend to envision democracy as the aggregation of citizens’ preferences (Miller 
1992). Moreover, as we review below, existing empirical evidence in favor of this view remains 
explicable with plausible alternatives. 
In this paper we examine the empirical merit of this position adoption hypothesis in a 
series of unique tests. Our evidence comes from field experiments conducted in collaboration 
with sitting politicians in which they randomly assigned aspects of their position-taking to voters. 
In the experiments, US state legislators sent their constituents official communications with 
randomly assigned content. In letters to constituents in treatment groups, the legislators staked 
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out positions on salient and controversial issues such as decriminalizing marijuana, the minimum 
wage, and policies toward undocumented immigrants. Further, legislators sometimes justified 
their positions on these issues with extensive arguments, but sometimes only minimally justified 
them. Ostensibly unrelated telephone surveys then probed the effects of this position-taking on 
citizens’ evaluations of legislators and views on the issues. 
Constituents’ reactions to these official legislative communications lend support to the 
position adoption perspective. When legislators sent their constituents a letter containing an issue 
position, these constituents were significantly more likely to adopt this position. Moreover, when 
the letters staked out positions the constituents had previously said they opposed, constituents 
learned legislators disagreed with them yet their evaluations of their legislators did not sour. (We 
knew voters’ issue positions because we surveyed them prior to the letters being sent.) Finally, 
these patterns did not depend on whether legislators provided extensive justifications for their 
positions or largely omitted them: legislators appeared to move their constituents’ opinions 
towards their own positions just as successfully by essentially announcing their positions; 
likewise, citizens did not judge their legislators negatively even when their legislators baldly 
asserted a position with which the constituent had previously disagreed. 
These findings lend unique support to the position adoption perspective and have 
important implications for understanding the nature of politicians’ accountability to public 
opinion. To be sure, this evidence does not provide a comprehensive account of democratic 
accountability: it does not suggest politicians can always convince their constituents of anything, 
nor that they can reliably escape electoral punishment for everything. We hope future research 
further explores the scope conditions on these findings, as they are sure to exist. However, our 
results do provide unique evidence underscoring a notion deeply engrained in political thought: 
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across a wide range of policy matters, citizens appear willing to follow their leaders. 
 
How Voters React to Politicians’ Policy Positions: Theoretical Perspectives And Existing 
Evidence 
To appreciate the theoretical issues at stake in our studies, consider the answers three 
prevalent theoretical perspectives would offer to the following question: how do voters react 
when politicians support policies they oppose? Table 1 summarizes these predictions. 
Table 1. How Do Voters React When Politicians Support Policies They Oppose? Empirical 
Predictions of Competing Perspectives on Opinion Leadership 
Empirical 
Question 
Issue Voting 
Predictions 
Elite Persuasion 
Predictions 
Position 
Adoption 
Predictions 
Do leaders lose 
support from 
citizens? 
Yes Yes, unless 
persuasive 
arguments 
provided 
No 
Do leaders 
change citizens’ 
issue opinions? 
No No, unless 
persuasive 
arguments 
provided 
Yes 
 
The traditional view of democracy conceives of citizens as issue voters. In its strictest 
form, it suggests that citizens hold politicians in less esteem when politicians support policies 
citizens oppose, and that politicians cannot meaningfully influence citizens’ policy preferences. 
Indeed, in this view, just about the least politically advantageous thing a politician could do is 
announce to a constituent that they have a contrary position on an issue. The elite persuasion 
perspective would offer the same predictions if politicians did not offer persuasive arguments 
justifying their positions; but, if politicians can argue that their positions are consistent with 
citizens’ values and predispositions or frame them as such, they might successfully shape public 
opinion and avoid paying electoral costs for taking positions citizens once opposed. Finally, the 
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position adoption perspective predicts that, as citizens often defer to legislators’ policy 
judgments, citizens will not react negatively when political leaders take positions they oppose 
and may even adopt their positions, regardless of whether politicians justify them. 
No one thinks any of these perspectives describes how all voters think about all issues in 
all circumstances. Nevertheless, the possibility that ‘position adoption’ can describe public 
opinion on salient issues is itself controversial (see Bullock 2011 for review). However, although 
a growing body of research is consistent with this notion, it contains potentially important 
ambiguities.1 
One common empirical approach examines how citizens respond to elite position-taking 
and rhetoric in the real political world, but does not alter aspects of the elite communication to 
which citizens are exposed (e.g., Abramowitz 1978; Lenz 2009, 2012; Zaller 1992).2 While these 
studies find that citizens often adopt the views of their favored politicians, they leave the nature 
of this opinion change unclear because elite communication tends to contain a mix of source 
cues and persuasive messages. To appreciate this ambiguity, consider Abramowitz (1978)’s 
pathbreaking study of the Carter-Ford debates. Abramowitz (1978) found that voters who viewed 
the debates tended to adopt their favored candidates’ position on unemployment insurance and 
did not alter their evaluation of the candidates based on their prior view on the issue. When 
Democrats adopted Carter’s position on unemployment insurance after the debate, were they 
swayed by Carter’s arguments, which presumably were justified on the basis of the liberal values 
Democrats tend to share? Or, did Democrats change their opinions simply because they learned 
                                                
1 We do not review the limitations of issue voting research at length due to space constraints. However, we have no 
doubt that citizens judge politicians based on their issue positions at least some of the time; our concern here, in part, 
is whether it is also common that they do not. 
2 See also Achen and Bartels (2006); Arceneaux (2006); Bartels (2006); Gabel and Scheve (2007); Jacoby (1988); 
Layman and Carsey (2002); Matsubayashi (2013); Mondak (1993); Minozzi et al. (2014). 
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of Carter’s positions and deferred to his judgment?3 These processes imply quite different 
implications but are observationally equivalent in panel data often read as supporting the position 
adoption view (e.g., Lenz 2009, 2012). Because political discourse tends to contain a mix of elite 
source cues and persuasive messages, there is little direct evidence about how elites lead public 
opinion when they do. 
Helping address this weakness, studies taking a second empirical approach have traded 
naturalism for greater control over the contents of elite communication. In particular, 
experiments in lab and survey settings have attempted to assess the processes that condition 
opinion leadership and electoral accountability to public opinion (e.g., Bullock 2011; Cohen 
2003).4 However, while theoretically innovative, questions about external validity remain (e.g., 
Findley et al. 2013). For example, citizens aware they are being studied may feel compelled to 
misrepresent their true policy opinions and evaluations of politicians (Bullock et al. 2013).  
Alternatively, psychological theories of attitude change argue that “if people are not thinking 
very much about the persuasive message...their attitudes should be affected little, if any, 
by...argument quality,” (Petty et al. 1995) and individuals may think about political messages 
more effortfully when they know they are being studied. 
We contribute to this body of evidence with unique field experiments that combine the 
naturalism of field studies and the control over content previously only available in lab and 
survey settings. These experiments, described in the next section, were designed to test the 
predictions from Table 1: how citizens react when politicians stake out policy positions, 
including those these citizens oppose, and the extent to which extensive justifications condition 
                                                
3 For similar reasons, that campaign advertisements which contain issue content can persuade (e.g., Rogers and 
Nickerson 2013) does not indicate whether the issue content they include is responsible for their effects (e.g., Martin 
2014). 
4 See also Arceneaux (2008); Cobb and Kuklinski (1997); Chong and Druckman (2007a, 2007b); Iyenger and 
Valentino (2000). 
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any impacts of such position-taking. 
 
Political Context and Design Overview  
We conducted our experiments in collaboration with eight Democratic state legislators 
from a Midwestern state.5 We conducted the first experiment in the summer of 2013 in 
collaboration with one legislator and the second experiment in the spring of 2014 with seven 
additional legislators. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics on Legislators and their Districts 
Legislator Terms of Service 2012 Obama Vote Share District Description 
Study 1    
 A 3 55% Rural 
Study 2    
 B 1 90% Urban 
 C 1 65% Urban/Suburban 
 D 4 75% Urban/Suburban 
 E 2 80% College Town 
 F 1 50% Rural 
 G 1 65% Urban/Suburban 
 H 2 50% Rural 
 
The eight collaborating legislators all came from the same state, but represented diverse 
districts (see Table 2). Some of the legislators represented swing districts where Obama won the 
2012 election by only a few percentage points, while others represented Democratic strongholds. 
The legislators were also split between urban, suburban, and rural areas. 
 Both experiments followed the same basic protocol, although there were important 
differences in the manipulations we describe later: 
1. Identification of Issues. We worked with each legislator to identify 5-10 salient policy 
disputes in the legislature that year on which each legislator was actively supporting or 
opposing a side. We then conducted small statewide pilot surveys using Google 
                                                
5 We received permission from the Human Subjects Committee at Yale to carry out these studies prior to carrying 
them out (IRB protocol #1303011700).  
 8 
Consumer Surveys to identify which four of the legislator’s positions were likely to have 
the least public support in their district. 
2. Baseline Surveys. We conducted baseline surveys of registered voters in each legislator’s 
district, querying their positions on their legislator’s four issues and their approval of 
their legislator. TargetSmart Communications provided the voter lists and Winning 
Connections conducted the surveys.6 We started each survey with a question about their 
attitude towards President Obama. We started with this question to capture their attention 
for the survey. Supplementary Appendix D presents question wordings. 
3. Exclusions. When constituents already agreed with a legislator on all four issues, we 
dropped them from the study. Less than five percent of the subjects fell in this category. 
4. Randomized Treatment Assignment. The remaining >95% of survey takers were assigned 
to treatment conditions along two dimensions: 
a. Whether Legislators Took An Issue Position Or Not; And, In Study 2, How It Was 
Justified. All subjects were first randomly assigned to whether they received a 
position-taking letter or not and, in the second study, in what manner this position 
was justified. These treatments differ by study and are described in greater detail 
later on. The key feature of both studies is that legislators sent some, randomly-
chosen constituents letters that contained the legislators’ issue positions while 
others did not receive letters with the legislator’s issue positions. 
b. On Which Issue The Legislator Took A Position. For all subjects who were 
randomly assigned to receive a letter with an issue position, we randomly 
assigned on which issue the legislator took a position. Citizens were only eligible 
                                                
6 Winning Connections surveyed only one person per household. In households with multiple voters, we randomly 
chose one person who the interviewers asked for on their initial call.  If the person was unavailable, we instructed 
interviewers to conduct the survey with another person on the voter list if they were available.  
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to be randomly assigned to receive issue positions with which they did not 
previously share the legislator’s position, either because they had no opinion or 
because they disagreed. (We expected ceiling effects for the issues on which 
citizens already shared the legislator’s position.) 
5. Treatment Delivery. Legislators sent the assigned letters from their legislative offices, on 
their official letterhead, and in envelopes clearly marked as coming from the state capitol. 
6. Follow-up Surveys. The week after the letters arrived, we conducted a follow-up survey 
to appraise the effect of the letters on constituents’ issue positions and evaluations of the 
legislator. In Study 1, among those who completed the first survey 33% completed the 
reinterview; for Study 2, 41% did. Tables A2 and A3 in Supplementary Materials show 
that the treatment groups are balanced on pre-treatment attitudes among survey takers, 
allaying concerns that differential attrition biases the estimates.7 
This design presents several advantages. Because we randomly altered aspects of the 
communication voters received, we are able to test the theoretical predictions described in Table 
1. However, our field experimental design allows us to examine how citizens react to elites’ 
actual position-taking in the real world and when they are not aware they are being studied (e.g., 
Findley et al. 2013; Loewen et al. 2010). Moreover, the treatments provided a strong and 
credible signal about legislators’ positions, as they came directly from citizens’ legislators. 
 
Study 1 – One Legislator: Letter With Position versus No Letter Control 
 In this section we briefly discuss the first study we conducted, with Legislator A. 
                                                
7 Supplementary analysis (see Table A4 in the Supplementary Materials) also shows that we were somewhat more 
likely to successfully re-interview older voters and, in Study 2, those who initially held opinions on more issues. In 
this sense, as in nearly all experiments, our results represent a local average treatment effect for a slightly 
unrepresentative population, in our case one that is older and more politically engaged. 
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Constituents in this study received either (1) a letter from Legislator A in which this legislator A 
took a position on an issue related to policies he was working on in the legislature and that he 
believed were important to his district, or (2) no letter at all (a control group).  
 We first surveyed 1,210 voters in Legislator A’s district to determine who would be 
included in the experiment’s sampling frame. Of these 1,210 voters, 64 (5%) already agreed with 
the legislator on all four issues and were removed from the sampling frame. The remaining 1,146 
voters were randomly assigned with equal probability to either receive a letter or to not receive 
any letter.8 Legislator A then sent letters that contained his policy positions to the constituents in 
the treatment group (see Supplementary Appendix B). Finally, we successfully re-interviewed 
395 voters a week after the letters were sent. 
A manipulation check shows that constituents noticed the letters. We asked voters on the 
post survey, “Do you happen to recall if you’ve received anything in the mail from 
Representative [Legislator A] this year?” Over 50 percent of the voters assigned to the letter 
condition answered in the affirmative versus only 20 percent in the no letter control (p < 0.001).9  
 We next estimate the effect of the letter on voters’ issue positions using OLS. For the 
dependent variable in column 1, we recoded the voters’ responses to the issue position questions 
on the follow up survey as a 0-1 scale taking the following values: 1 = the constituents’ position 
is the same as the legislator’s, 0.5 = the constituent is undecided; 0 = the constituents’ position is 
opposite the legislator’s. Table 3 shows that Legislator A’s letters moved his constituents’ policy 
opinions to be more line with his positions. Voters who were assigned to receive a letter were 
                                                
8 If constituents did not agree on more than two issues, we also randomized which two of the issues the letters 
discussed. This necessitates two steps to assure unbiased inference (Gerber and Green 2012). First, because voters 
were eligible for different numbers of issue positions on the basis of how many issues on which they did not agree 
with the legislator, we condition our analyses on strata indicators for the number of issues on which each voter did 
not agree. Second, when we analyze data at the issue-respondent level to estimate the effect of including an issue in 
a letter on opinion, we cluster standard errors at the respondent level. 
9 Table A1 in Supplementary Appendix A shows these results. 
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moved 0.063 scale points towards agreeing with the legislator on the issue their letter contained. 
The next two columns present OLS results where we recode the dependent variable into two 
dummy variables for whether the voter either agreed or disagreed with the legislator. The issue 
letters caused voters to be about 6.5 percentage points more likely to agree with the legislator 
(and 6 percentage points less likely to disagree with him) relative to those who did not receive 
the letter. 
Table 3. Study 1 - Effect of Letter On Issue Opinion, OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Independent Variables Agree Scale (0-1) Binary: Agree 
vs. No Opinion 
or Disagree 
Binary: Disagree 
vs. No Opinion 
or Agree 
    
Sent Policy Letter on this Issue 0.063* 0.065* -0.060 
 (0.025) (0.030) (0.031) 
Lagged Opinion: Disagreed with  -0.359* -0.325* 0.393* 
   Legislator (vs. No Opinion) (0.130) (0.142) (0.181) 
    
Dummy Variables for Strata? Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations (Issue-Respondents) 865 865 865 
Clusters (Respondents) 386 386 386 
R-squared 0.167 0.074 0.220 
Note: Models estimated using linear regression models.  Cluster standard errors in parentheses * 
p<0.05, two-tailed. 
 
 To analyze the effect of the letters on citizens’ attitudes towards the legislator, we restrict 
the sample to those who disagreed with the legislator’s positions on the issues in the letters they 
received and compare them to people who could have received such letters but received no letter 
at all. This means we exclude constituents who received letters with positions they merely had no 
position on and constituents in the control group who only could have received such letters. We 
restrict the sample in this way because the relevant theoretical predictions relate to opinions held 
by voters who at baseline had disagreed with the issue position the legislator took (or, in the 
control group, would have taken) in a letter. 
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In Column 1 of Table 4 we use OLS to estimate the impact of the policy letter on voter’s 
opinion of the legislator as measured on a 5-point scale (that we rescale to 0-1) where increasing 
values indicate more positive evaluations. The results suggest that Legislator A did not face 
significant backlash for sending letters to his constituents taking positions they opposed – indeed, 
although not significant, the voters in the treatment group had, on average, a more positive 
evaluation of Legislator A. The remaining columns estimate the effect on binary indicators for 
whether voters viewed the legislator either more positively or negatively. These regressions 
indicate constituents were significantly more likely to approve of the legislator after getting a 
letter containing a position they disagreed with, and offer only weak evidence that some 
constituents reacted negatively. 
Table 4. Study 1 - Effect of Letter on Approval of Legislator, Constituents Who Disagreed 
On Issues Only  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Independent Variables Approval Scale 
(0-1) 
Binary Approve Binary Disapprove 
    
Sent Policy Letter 0.037 0.135* 0.070 
 (0.032) (0.058) (0.044) 
Prior Approval of Legislator 0.160* 0.220* -0.139* 
 (0.014) (0.025) (0.019) 
Constant 0.549* 0.251* 0.133* 
 (0.023) (0.041) (0.031) 
    
Observations 193 193 193 
R-squared 0.421 0.311 0.224 
Note: Models estimated using linear regression models.  Standard errors in parentheses. * 
p<0.05. Sample only includes those who opposed the legislator’s position on both issues in 
letter. 
 
 Study 1 demonstrates that legislators’ communications can affect constituents’ opinion on 
issues and hints at minimal downsides of staking out policy positions constituents claim to 
oppose. Study 2 builds on the evidence of Study 1 to answer two important questions. 
First, why did Legislator A’s communications cause constituents to adopt his positions? 
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Legislator A’s letter offered (short) arguments for his positions that could have persuaded his 
constituents that his position was consistent with their predispositions and values (consistent with 
elite persuasion). Alternatively, voters may simply be adopting his stances (consistent with 
position adoption). Study 2 therefore manipulated the extent to which legislators attempted to 
persuade so as to better distinguish between these explanations of opinion leadership. 
Second, did Legislator A really not lose support with constituents for taking a position 
they disagreed with? Receiving a letter could have a positive effect on the legislator’s 
favorability, which could be offset by a theoretically important negative effect of the positions it 
contained. Study 2 therefore included a control letter without any positions in order to hold 
constant the presence of a letter and vary only the presence of counter-attitudinal issue positions. 
 
Study 2 – Varying the Presence of Positions and Extensive Arguments With Seven 
Legislators 
 Our second study followed the same basic protocol as Study 1 but introduced a few 
important design changes. First, we recruited seven additional legislators to participate (see 
Table 1 for information about these legislators and their districts). With the larger number of 
legislators, we were able to recruit a larger sample of constituents and increase the precision of 
the estimates. Assessing the average effect of seven legislators and seventeen policy issues also 
grants the experiment a stronger claim to generalizability. 
 More importantly, we altered both the control and treatment conditions. As before, 
legislators in the second experiment sent letters to all their constituents who did not already agree 
with their position on at least one issue (excluding the small number of voters who agreed with 
them on all issues already). However, constituents were randomly assigned to receive one of 
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three letters:10 
(i) a “control” letter where the legislator introduced themselves, described the 
services their office could conduct for constituents, and described a few locally 
oriented achievements (e.g., designating a building downtown a historic place), 
serving as a baseline, 
(ii) a “basic justification” policy letter that added language in which the legislators 
took a position the recipient had not agreed with previously and made only the 
briefest justification for their position, and 
(iii) an “extensive justification” policy letter that added more extensive arguments 
for this position designed to appeal to citizens’ values. 
 Comparing the “basic justification” and “extensive justification” treatments allows us to 
test how providing extensive arguments affect a legislator’s ability to persuade constituents. In 
both cases, the legislator stated their position on the issue with one line, always the same. In the 
“basic justification” policy letter, they then provided only restatements of their positions and 
brief, general assertions that their position was desirable such as “This would have a positive 
impact on the lives of many [STATE] residents and their families.” For example, one of the 
legislators wrote the following about a proposed state pension plan in the “basic justification” 
condition: 
I am supporting the creation of a state-administered retirement plan open to all 
[STATE] workers. I believe that [STATE] workers should have access to a system that 
supports them during retirement. This new system would have a positive impact on the 
lives of many [STATE] residents and their families. 
 
 By contrast, legislators provided more detail about the reasons behind their positions in 
the “extensive justification” condition, attempting to appeal to citizens’ values and 
                                                
10 A pure control group would have been desirable, however the finite size of the state legislative districts we studied 
limited our sample size. 
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predispositions. For example, the same state legislator instead included the following paragraphs 
in the “extensive justification” condition for the pension plan: 
I am supporting the creation of a state-administered retirement plan open to all 
[STATE] workers. 
 
[STATE] boasts one of the best pension systems in the nation for government workers. 
For decades, [STATE] state employees have relied on the [STATE RETIREMENT 
SYSTEM] pension for their livelihood after retiring. The fund is solvent and often 
modeled by other states with failing systems. Because this fund for public workers has 
been so successful, I support the creation of a similar state-administered retirement plan 
for private workers. 
 
I also support the creation of a [STATE] system because everyone who works hard 
should be able to look forward to a stable retirement, regardless of if they are a public or 
private worker. Right now, less than one-half of Americans have any retirement assets at 
all, and financial insecurity in retirement is all too common for our seniors. Establishing a 
[STATE SYSTEM] for private sector workers would make sure that everyone who works 
hard can look forward to a stable retirement. 
 
To the extent elite opinion leadership is generated as elites justify their positions 
persuasively and highlight how they are consistent with citizens’ values, we should expect the 
“extensive” condition to tend to produce stronger issue opinion change, and, potentially, for the 
“basic justification” condition to generate backlash. However, to the extent citizens are willing to 
adopt positions merely because an elite has taken it, we should expect the content of the “basic 
justification” condition to have a similar effect on citizens’ opinions as the “argument” 
condition.11 
 As with the first experiment, the letters all shared the same basic structure: a paragraph of 
introductory text providing biographical information about the legislator, issue positions in the 
“basic justification” and “extensive justification” conditions, and a closing paragraph.  
                                                
11 An alternative possibility is that citizens will not care to read the arguments although would be more strongly 
influenced if they did. We see this possibility as largely consistent with the position adoption view, insofar as it 
envisions citizens not caring to consider legislators’ arguments before changing their view. As the experiment takes 
place in a field setting, this would be consistent with the notion that such justifications are not necessary for issue 
opinion change in the real world (even if they might have effects if they were encountered) even if they can enhance 
it in survey or lab settings. 
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Table 5 lists the issues used in the letters and the percent of issue-respondent observations 
in our analysis for each. With seven different legislators choosing four different issues, the policy 
letters covered a broad range of topics. These issues included raising the minimum wage, 
allowing undocumented immigrants to obtain drivers’ licenses, putting pregnant women 
suspected of using drugs in police custody, school vouchers, taxes, redistricting commissions, 
economic development in their region, and much more.  In some cases, more than one legislator 
wrote about the same issue.  In all such cases, the legislators all took the same position on the 
issue, though they sometimes used different arguments for that position.  Anonymized versions 
of these letters are provided in Supplementary Appendix C. 
Table 5. Issues from Study 2 
Issue Percent of sample 
Budget deficit 
  
5.0% 
Pregnant women suspected of drug use can be put in jail 
  
2.0% 
Criminals have records expunged from minor crimes 
  
3.5% 
Gas tax increase 
   
3.5% 
Driver’s licenses for undocumented immigrants 
   
6.0% 
Marijuana decriminalization 
   
3.5% 
Medical marijuana legalization 
   
6.6% 
Minimum wage increase to $10.10 
   
19.5% 
State-sponsored pension plan 
   
9.1% 
Workplace protections for pregnant women 
   
3.9% 
Local property tax increase 
   
2.0% 
New state commuter rail system 
   
4.0% 
Non-partisan redistricting 
   
8.3% 
Trying seventeen-year-olds as juveniles, not adults 
   
3.4% 
Undocumented immigrants eligible for in-state tuition at 
state colleges and universities 
   
3.5% 
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Voter identification requirements 
   
4.0% 
Private school vouchers 12.2% 
 
In Study 2, some individuals in the treatment group were eligible to receive the 
legislators’ positions on multiple issues but the letter contained the legislator’s position on only 
one randomly determined issue. As in Study 1, we use the issue-respondent as the unit of 
observation when estimating the effects of the letters on issue opinion and base our analysis on a 
sample of 2,528 voter-issue observations from 1,047 individual voters. For the analysis, we 
cluster our standard errors at the respondent level and include dummies for the number of issues 
the respondent was eligible for receiving a position on to account for the fact that the probability 
of receiving each issue treatment depended on the number of issues where the voter was eligible 
for treatment. 
 
Manipulation Checks: Did constituents remember the letters and learn legislators’ positions? 
First, we checked that respondents received and read the letters. At the end of the follow 
up survey, we asked a random subset of voters (each voter had a one-fourth probability of being 
asked) whether they remembered receiving a letter from the legislator in the past year.  Over 60 
percent of subjects responded in the affirmative.  Although we have no pure control group to 
measure what share of voters would have falsely remembered receiving a letter from the 
legislator recently, we are encouraged that we observed a similar share of voters recalling 
receiving a letter in Study 2 as in the treatment group for Study 1.12 Table A1 gives the 
breakdown by treatment group and shows that there were no significant differences across the 
treatments. 
                                                
12 We were also concerned that at least one of the legislative offices might have had difficulty getting their letters 
mailed and delivered before surveying began, but the share of constituents who recalled receiving a letter did not 
meaningfully differ across the districts. 
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Further, the voters who were sent a letter with a position were also far more likely to 
correctly identify their legislators’ position on the issue the letter contained than voters sent the 
control letters or a letter on a different issue. In the post-survey we asked a random subset of 
voters (each voter had a three-fourths probability of being asked) to indicate their legislators’ 
position on one of the issues they were eligible for treatment.13 Table 6 shows the results from a 
linear regression that tests whether respondents were more likely to correctly identify their 
legislator’s position on a given issue if they were sent a policy letter on that issue. The outcome 
was coded as 1 if the recipient correctly identified the legislators’ position and 0 if the recipient 
did not correctly identify the legislators’ position. Subjects were significantly more likely to 
correctly recall their legislators’ position on the issue their letter was randomly assigned to 
contain. 
Table 6. Study 2 Manipulation Check – Did Constituents Learn Legislators’ Positions? 
DV=Correctly Identify Legislator’s Position (1) 
Basic Justification 0.108* 
 (0.035) 
Extensive Justification 0.137* 
     (0.038) 
  
Dummy Variables for Strata? Yes 
  
Observations (Respondents) 1,077 
R-squared 0.062 
Note: Dependent variable is correct knowledge of legislators’ positions. Each individual asked 
about only one of their legislator’s issue positions. Model is estimated via an OLS regression 
model. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, two-tailed. 
 
Results: Opinion Leadership 
We first examine whether the positions legislators took in the letters influenced voters’ 
issue opinions. In the post-survey we asked constituents where they stood on the issues where 
they did not already agree with the legislator previously. As in Study 1, we recoded voters’ 
                                                
13 We only asked about one issue for each voter because our survey budget was constrained. 
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responses to these questions to create an ordinal variable on a three-point scale: the voter 
disagrees with the legislator’s position, the voter is unsure on the issue, or the voter agrees with 
the legislator’s positions, coded on a 0-1 scale as 0, 0.5, and 1 respectively. 
Table 7 presents an OLS regression estimating the effect on respondent’s issue opinions 
of the two different types of issue letters, relative to the baseline of receiving the control letter 
(i.e., the letter without any issue content).  If successfully appealing to citizens’ values is 
necessary for legislators to affect public opinion, we should see that the extensive justifications 
treatment has a larger effect on voters’ opinions.  However, if citizens were reacting to the mere 
fact that their legislator had taken a position, the basic justification treatment should affect 
opinion just as much as the extensive justifications letter. 
We find little evidence that legislators’ arguments were responsible for their persuasive 
impact. The results in Table 7 show that the basic justification treatment moved individuals 
about 0.04 scale points towards agreement and away from disagreement, similar to the same 
effect in Study 1. The coefficient on extensive justification treatment variable is also positive, but 
it is smaller in magnitude and not statistically significant; this suggests that including attempts at 
persuasive argument and appeals to citizens’ values is unlikely to increase the effect of the 
letters.14 Legislators were able to move constituents’ opinions by stating their own positions with 
minimal justification; but, there is no evidence that extensive justifications made these positions 
more persuasive. These results are most consistent with the position adoption view.15 
                                                
14 Even as the coefficient for the extensive justification letters is smaller, we would not make too much of this 
difference. The difference between the two coefficients is not significant, as the position adoption theory would 
predict. Under elite persuasion theory, we would expect this coefficient to be larger than the coefficient on the basic 
justification letter, and for it to be significantly so. 
15 We also tested for whether the letters that provided arguments polarized respondents.  Perhaps some voters were 
pushed towards the legislator, while others were pushed away from the legislator.  If that were true, then we might 
see that the variance was greater when the voters received one of the argument letters than when they did not. 
However, the variance of the outcome was very similar for the three groups:   
         Std. Dev. (No Arguments) = 0.81 
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Table 7. Study 2 - Effect of Letter On Issue Opinion 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Independent Variables Agree Scale (0-1) Agree Binary Disagree Binary 
    
Basic Justification 0.039* 0.045 -0.071* 
 (0.015) (0.026) (0.027) 
Extensive Justification 0.022 0.032 -0.035 
 (0.016) (0.026) (0.028) 
Lagged Opinion: Disagreed with  -0.141* -0.087* 0.336* 
    Legislator (vs. No Opinion) (0.016) (0.026) (0.030) 
    
Dummy Variables for Strata? Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 2,528 2,528 2,528 
Clusters (Respondents) 1,140 1,140 1,140 
R-squared 0.101 0.029 0.158 
Note: Models estimated using linear regression models.  Cluster standard errors in parentheses * 
p<0.05, two-tailed. 
 
Results: Approval of Legislator (Constituents Who Disagree on Issues Only) 
 Arguably the most controversial claim of the position adoption perspective is that citizens 
sometimes do not hold their representatives in less esteem when they learn that their 
representatives are pursuing a policy they oppose. While Study 1 presented evidence consistent 
with the view that citizens were actually indifferent to this information, Study 1 left open the 
possibility that a negative effect of this information was “cancelled out” by the positive effect of 
receiving a letter at all. Therefore, in Study 2, we compare a control group of citizens who 
disagreed with their legislator on an issue but received a “control letter” with no issue content to 
the treatment group citizens who disagreed with their legislator on an issue and received a letter 
in which the legislator stated a position with which the voter disagreed. 
We find no evidence that legislators suffered electoral costs by taking positions 
                                                                                                                                                       
         Std. Dev. (Basic Arguments) = 0.84 
         Std. Dev. (Extensive Arguments) = 0.84 
The variance is slightly higher for the arguments treatment, but it is very far from being statistically significant.  The 
p-value of the variance ratio test of whether the variance for the no arguments group is the same as the relative to the 
voters in the arguments treatments is 0.24. We acknowledge an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this test. 
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constituents disagreed with; citizens who received letters from their legislators taking positions 
they had disagreed with previously evaluated their legislators no less favorably than those who 
received a “control letter” with no position (but disagreed with their legislator on at least one 
issue, so could have received such a letter).  Column 1 of Table 8 presents the results of the 
policy letters on voters’ approval of their legislators, coded on a 7-point scale we have rescaled 
to 0-1.16 There is little evidence that constituents reacted negatively; indeed, the point estimates 
are positive. Given the 95% confidence interval, we can rule out negative effects of sending 
letters with contrary positions larger than around 0.03 scale points.  
Table 8. Study 2 - Effect of Letter on Approval of Legislator, Constituents Who Disagreed 
on Issues Only 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Independent Variables Approval Scale (0-1) Binary Approve Binary Disapprove 
    
Basic Justification  0.014 0.011 -0.029 
 (0.023) (0.038) (0.034) 
Extensive Justification 0.016 0.027 -0.005 
 (0.024) (0.040) (0.035) 
Prior Approval of Legislator 0.239* 0.308* -0.218* 
 (0.016) (0.026) (0.022) 
    
Dummy Variables for Strata? Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 743 743 743 
R-squared 0.338 0.231 0.199 
Note: Models estimated using linear regression models.  Standard errors in parentheses. * 
p<0.05. Sample only includes those who opposed the legislator’s position. 
 
In contrast to the clear impact of these letters on constituents’ issue opinions, there appear 
to be no effects on their attitudes towards legislators. However, as with all null effect estimates, 
                                                
16 We used a scale instead of a binary variable in order to increase statistical power; this is especially important 
given that the results suggest a null effect. The legislator favorability question was branching, similar to the standard 
party identification question on the ANES. Subjects coded at 0 reported an unfavorable impression of the legislator, 
then reported it was strong; subjects at 0.166 recorded an unfavorable impression of the legislator, then reported it 
was weak; subjects at 0.333 recorded being indifferent, then reported leaning towards an unfavorable impression; 
subjects at 0.5 reported being unfamiliar with the legislator, or, reported being indifferent, and that they did not lean 
either way; subjects at 0.666 reported being indifferent toward the legislator, then reported leaning towards a 
favorable impression; subjects at 0.833 recorded a favorable impression of the legislator, then reported it was weak; 
subjects at 1 recorded a favorable impression of the legislator, then reported it was strong. 
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it remains possible that there was some negative effect of these letters too small to detect, 
especially because not every constituent read the letter (see Table 6). Regardless of the 
mechanism for this finding, the results are most in line with the position adoption perspective. 
 Are some issue different? We have no doubt the dynamics of accountability operate 
differently for different issues, but we see little evidence of heterogeneity at the issue level in this 
data. Figures A1 and A2 in the Supplementary Appendix A examine this possibility by depicting 
the effects separately for each issue. Most issues have few observations associated with them so 
the effects are imprecisely estimated. Significantly, the results show that the pattern is not driven 
by any one issue. Although there is variation in the point estimates across issues, a Q-test could 
not reject that this variation is due to sampling variability. 
 Future work should also consider whether the treatment effects are moderated by voter 
attributes, such as party identification or strength of opinion. We consider the role of party 
briefly here. The best design for answering this question would experimentally manipulate the 
presence of party cues, a technique common in survey experiments. The legislators we 
cooperated with were ultimately responsible for the letter’s content here, however, and these 
legislators preferred not to send a message that contained a party cue. As a result, we did not ask 
voters about their party identification. However, we did ask all respondents about their attitude 
towards Obama in the pre-survey. Using Obama approval as a proxy for party, we consider how 
Obama-approvers and Obama-disapprovers responded to the treatments in an exploratory 
analysis in Tables A9-A12. In brief, no clear pattern of results emerges from these analyses. 
Given the limitations of not having better measures of party identification, these results should 
be viewed as very preliminary. Future studies should clearly continue exploring the role of party 
identification, ideally beginning at the design stage. 
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Discussion 
 Students of democratic politics have long debated the role mass opinion plays in 
constraining elected officials’ policy decisions. The consistent pattern that citizens tend to 
support the positions their elected officials take has inspired three distinct theoretical 
perspectives: an issue voting perspective that conceptualizes citizens’ policy preferences as firm 
commitments that chiefly determine how they evaluate politicians and envisions legislators 
strongly responding to these preferences; an elite persuasion perspective that agrees issue 
opinions strongly determine voters’ choices but that elites are capable of persuading citizens to 
change their issue opinions; and, a position adoption perspective that citizens defer to elite’s 
policy judgments rather than judging them on the basis of their issue positions. 
 No one believes any of these perspectives explains the politics of all issues, under all 
circumstances, and for all voters. But the idea that position adoption describes the politics of 
salient issues even some of the time has been especially controversial. When political elites 
simply announce their positions without making persuasive appeals to citizens’ values, can they 
shape public opinion and avoid electoral costs? In this paper we probed these questions with a 
series of unique field experiments conducted in cooperation with politicians themselves. In our 
studies, political elites randomly assigned aspects of their communications to voters about their 
policy positions, among the first such studies we are aware (however, see Wantchekon 2003).17 
The policies in question were neither insignificant nor uncontroversial, and included 
decriminalizing marijuana, raising the minimum wage, and policies toward undocumented 
immigrants. 
                                                
17 See Cover and Brumberg (1982), Loewen and Rubenson (2010), and Minozzi et al. (2014) for studies that do not 
manipulate the content of elite messages. 
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 Our investigation first uncovered strong evidence that legislators can shape constituents’ 
views on issues by merely staking out their positions. The constituents who received letters 
containing legislators’ positions were significantly more likely to subsequently share their 
legislators’ view. In our second study, we also found that constituents who received lengthy 
arguments from legislators justifying their positions were no more likely to change their opinions 
as constituents to whom legislators provided little justification. 
 We next examined whether citizens evaluated their legislators more negatively when 
their legislators directly stated a position citizens had opposed, examining a core mechanism 
central to theories of democratic accountability. Many traditional perspectives on democratic 
politics would suggest that just about the least politically advantageous thing a politician could 
do is inform their constituents they disagree with them on an issue – or, if they must do so, they 
are typically expected to have to provide persuasive reasons justifying their positions to avoid 
constituents’ ire. Our experiment put these notions to a stark test, as the politicians we 
cooperated with randomly varied whether they did just this. Significantly, we found no evidence 
that constituents held their legislators in less esteem when legislators announced support for 
policies they had previously opposed – regardless of the extent to which legislators provided 
justifications for their positions. There was little evidence that these patterns meaningfully 
differed across issues. 
 We did not expect the context that produced these findings – a single letter from 
relatively unknown state legislators – to be especially friendly to the position adoption 
hypothesis. Most constituents likely knew little about their state legislator before they received 
the letter (indeed only 20 percent of the control group in Study 2 had heard of their legislator), 
making it surprising that information that their legislator disagreed with them had no detectable 
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impact on their evaluations of their legislator.  
 There is still a great deal our evidence does not tell us. We know little about the issue-, 
elite- or citizen-level factors that might condition these effects. Future studies should also 
examine which constituents are most likely to be affected. We also expect that these patterns 
may certainly differ across issues, such as moral issues that clearly implicate citizens’ core 
values (e.g., Carmines and Stimson 1980; Ryan 2014; Tesler 2014) or that citizens find 
particularly personally important (e.g., Krosnick 1990). Likewise, competing communication 
may well change these effects (Chong and Druckman 2007b).  Future research should explore 
these questions.  
Our evidence also says little about why citizens adopt politicians’ positions. Dating back 
at least to Burke (1774), democratic theorists have stressed that citizens may choose to delegate 
to elected officials because they recognize legislators may possess superior information, 
expertise, and judgment (see also Bianco 1994). Therefore, one conjecture is that voters defer to 
politicians because they trust elected officials or authority figures more generally. However, such 
opinion leadership is not necessarily “blind” (e.g., Lenz 2012): citizens may have simply inferred 
that their elected officials are more familiar with the details of the issues at stake and trusted their 
judgment. On the other hand, these elites may have earned this trust through prior activity or 
demonstrated similarity (Fenno 1978; Bianco 1994). For example, in our letters, all of the 
legislators included a biographical paragraph about their connection to the community (see 
Appendix B for the text of the letters). We look forward to seeing future studies build on the 
experimental approaches we have described to better understand the mechanisms at play. 
With these important caveats aside, our results do underscore the continuing relevance of 
a controversial notion deeply engrained in political thought: under many circumstances, 
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democratic citizens follow their leaders. This does not imply citizens fail to hold their elected 
officials accountable altogether – for example, the citizens who behaved consistently with 
position adoption in our study may be judging these politicians based on their results, rather than 
their policy methods (Fiorina 1981). Our results also leave open the possibility that politicians 
think the constraints public opinion places on them are stronger than they are (e.g., Berinsky and 
Lenz 2014). Indeed, the legislators expressed surprise at their success in affecting constituent 
opinion; as the citizens who choose to interact with legislators tend to be more politically 
engaged, legislators may form inaccurate understandings of the degree to which the average 
constituent has firm positions on issues (Miller and Stokes 1963). Such questions will also be 
fruitful avenues for further research. 
Reviewing a popular theoretical conception, Miller (1992) defines democracy as “the 
aggregation of [citizens’] independently formed preferences” (p. 55) into issue positions taken by 
politicians. Democracy may well function in this manner sometimes. However, the evidence 
presented here provides a rare window into how democracy can also serve precisely the opposite 
function: distributing politicians’ policy judgments to citizens. 
 
 
  
 27 
References 
Abramowitz, Alan I. 1978. “The Impact of a Presidential Debate on Voter Rationality.” 
American Journal of Political Science 22(3): 680-690. 
Achen, Christopher H. and Larry M. Bartels. 2006. “It Feels Like We’re Thinking: The 
Rationalizing Voter and Electoral Democracy.” Working Paper. Available at 
http://www.princeton.edu/csdp/events/AchenBartels011107/AchenBartels011107.pdf. 
Arceneaux, Kevin. 2006. “Do Campaigns Help Voters Learn? A Cross-National Analysis.” 
British Journal of Political Science 36: 159-173. 
Arceneaux, Kevin. 2008. "Can Partisan Cues Diminish Democratic Accountability?" Political 
Behavior 30(2): 139-160. 
Bartels, Larry M. 2005. “Homer Gets A Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the American 
Mind.” Perspectives on Politics 3(1): 15-31. 
Berinsky, Adam J. and Gabriel S. Lenz. 2014. “Red Scare? Revisiting Joe McCarthy’s Influence 
on 1950s Elections.” Public Opinion Quarterly 78(3). 
Bianco, William T. Trust: Representatives and constituents. Michigan. 
Brody, Richard A. and Benjamin I. Page. 1972. “Comment: The Assessment of Policy Voting.” 
American Political Science Review 66(2): 450-458. 
Bullock, John G. 2011. “Elite Influence on Public Opinion in an Informed Electorate. American 
Political Science Review 105 (August): 496-515. 
Bullock, John, Alan S. Gerber, Seth J. Hill, and Gregory A. Huber. 2013. “Partisan Bias in 
Factual Beliefs about Politics.” NBER Working Paper No. 19080. Available at 
http://huber.research.yale.edu/materials/39_paper.pdf. 
Carmines, Edward G. and James A. Stimson. 1980. “The Two Faces of Issue Voting.” American 
 28 
Political Science Review 74(1): 78-91. 
Chong, Dennis and James N. Druckman. 2007a. “Framing Theory.” Annual Review of Political 
Science 10: 103-126. 
Chong, Dennis and James N. Druckman. 2007b. “Framing Public Opinion in Competitive 
Democracies.” American Political Science Review 101(4): 637-655. 
Cobb, Michael D. and James H. Kuklinski. 1997. “Changing Minds: Political Arguments and 
Political Persuasion.” American Journal of Political Science 41(1): 88-121. 
Cohen, Geoffrey L. 2003. “Party Over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group Influence on 
Political Beliefs.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 85(5): 808-822. 
Cover, Albert D. and Bruce S. Brumberg. 1982. “Baby Books and Ballots: The Impact of 
Congressional Mail on Constituent Opinion.” American Political Science Review 76(2): 
347-359. 
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row. 
Fenno, Richard F. 1978. Home Style: House Members in Their Districts. Longman. 
Findley, Michael G., Brock Laney, Daniel L. Nielson, and J.C. Sharman. 2013. “Deceptive 
Studies or Deceptive Answers? Competing Global Field and Survey Experiments on 
Anonymous Incorporation.” Manuscript, University of Texas, Austin. Available at 
http://watson.brown.edu/files/watson/imce/events/2014/pef/Sharman_etal_Brown.pdf. 
Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. Retrospective voting in American national elections. Yale. 
Fox, Justin and Kenneth W. Shotts. 2009. “Delegates or trustees? A theory of political 
accountability.” Journal of Politics 71(4): 1225-1237. 
Gabel, Matthew and Kenneth Scheve. 2007. “Estimating the Effect of Elite Communications on 
Public Opinion Using Instrumental Variables.” American Journal of Political Science 
 29 
51(4): 1013-1028. 
Gerber, Alan S. and Donald P. Green. 2012. Field Experiments: Design, Analysis, and 
Interpretation. Norton. 
Grose, Christian R., Neil Malhotra, and Robert van Houweling. 2014. “Explaining Explanations: 
How Legislators Explain Their Policy Positions and How Citizens React.” Forthcoming, 
American Journal of Political Science. 
Jacoby, William G. 1988. “The Impact of Party Identification on Issue Attitudes.” American 
Journal of Political Science 32(3): 643-661. 
Jacoby, William G. 2000. “Issue Framing and Public Opinion on Government Spending.” 
American Journal of Political Science 44(4): 750-767. 
Kinder, Donald R. and Lynn M. Sanders. 1990. “Mimicking Political Debate with Survey 
Questions: The Case of White Opinion on Affirmative Action for Blacks,” p. 73-103 in 
Social Cognition Volume 8, Thinking About Politics: Comparisons of Experts and 
Novices. 
Kingdon, John W. 1989. Congressmen’s Voting Decisions. 3rd Edition. Michigan. 
Krosnick, Jon A. 1990. “Government policy and citizen passion: A study of issue publics in 
contemporary America.” Political Behavior 12(1): 59-92. 
Ladd, Jonathan M. and Gabriel S. Lenz. 2009. “Exploiting a Rare Communication Shift to 
Document the Persuasive Power of the News Media.” American Journal of Political 
Science 53(2): 394-410. 
Layman, Geoffrey C., and Thomas M. Carsey. 2002. "Party Polarization and 'Conflict Extension' 
in the American Electorate." American Journal of Political Science 46 (4): 786-802. 
Leeper, Thomas J. 2013. “Interest Groups and Political Attitudes.” Working Paper. Available at 
 30 
http://dpsa.dk/papers/ImmigrationGroupsFraming2013-10-21.pdf. 
Lenz, Gabriel S. 2009. “Learning and Opinion Change, Not Priming: Reconsidering the Priming 
Hypothesis.” American Journal of Political Science 53: 821-837. 
Lenz, Gabriel S. 2012. Follow The Leader? Chicago. 
Loewen, Peter J. and Daniel Rubenson. 2010. “For Want Of A Nail: Negative Persuasion in a 
Party Leadership Campaign.” Party Politics. 
Loewen, Peter J., Daniel Rubenson, and Leonard Wantchekon. 2010. “Help Me Help You: 
Conducting Field Experiments with Political Elites.” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 628(1): 165-175. 
Mackie, Diane and Joel Cooper. 1984. “Attitude Polarization: Effects of Group Membership.” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 46(3): 575-585. 
Mann, Thomas E. and Raymond Wolfinger. 1978. “Candidates and Parties in Congressional 
Elections.” American Political Science Review 74(3): 617-632. 
Martin, Gregory J. 2014. “The Informational Content of Campaign Advertising.” Working 
Paper. Available at 
http://www.wallis.rochester.edu/wallisseminarseries/martin_political_advertising.pdf. 
Matsubayashi, Tetsuya. 2013. “Do Politicians Shape Public Opinion?” British Journal of 
Political Science 43(2): 451-478. 
Milgram, Stanley. 1974. Obedience to Authority, New York: Harper and Row. 
Miller, David. 1992. “Social Choice and Deliberative Democracy.” Political Studies 40: 54-68. 
Minozzi, William and Michael A. Neblo and Kevin M. Esterling and David Lazer. 2014. Do 
Leaders Persuade? Field Experiment Evidence of Direct Persuasion by Members of 
Congress on Their Constituents. APSA 2014 Annual Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: 
 31 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2455232 
Mondak, Jeffrey J. 1993. “Source Cues and Policy Approval: The Cognitive Dynamics of Public 
Support for the Reagan Agenda.” American Journal of Political Science 37: 186-212. 
Nie, Norman H., Sidney Verba, and John Petrocik. 1976. The Changing American Voter. 
Cambridge. 
Petty, Richard E., Curtis P. Haugtvedt, and Stephen M. Smith. 1995. “Elaboration as a 
Determinant of Attitude Strength: Creating Attitudes That Are Persistent, Resistant, and 
Predictive of Behavior.” in Petty, Richard E. and Jon A. Krosnick. Attitude Strength: 
Antecedents and Consequences. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Rogers, Todd and David W. Nickerson. 2013. “Can Inaccurate Beliefs About Incumbents be 
Changed? And Can Reframing Change Votes?” Working Paper. 
Ryan, Timothy J. 2014. “Reconsidering Moral Issues in Politics.” Forthcoming, Journal of 
Politics. 
Tesler, Michael. 2014. “Priming Predispositions and Changing Policy Positions: An Account of 
When Mass Opinion is Primed or Changed.” Forthcoming, American Journal of Political 
Science. 
Wantchekon, Leonard. 2003. “Clientalism and voting behavior: evidence from a field experiment 
in Benin.” World Politics 55(3): 399-422. 
Zaller, John R. 1992. Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge. 
